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The growth of the Internet has been paralleled with a similar growth in online child exploitation. 
Since completely shutting down all child exploitation websites is difficult (or arguably 
impossible), the goal must be to find the most efficient way of identifying the key targets and then 
apprehend them. Traditionally, online investigations have been manual and centered on images.  
However, we argue that target prioritization needs to take more than just images into consideration, 
and that the investigating process needs to become more systematic. Drawing from a web-crawler 
we specifically designed for extracting child exploitation website networks, this study 1) examines 
the structure of ten child exploitation networks and compares it to a control group of sports-related 
websites, and 2) provides a measure (network capital) that allows for identifying the most 
important targets for law enforcement purposes among our sample of websites. Results show that 
network capital – a combination between severity of content (images, videos, and text) and 
connectivity (links to other websites) – is a more reliable measure of target prioritization than more 




The Internet has revolutionized the way that we interact with others, as well as 
how business is conducted. While this revolution has facilitated numerous 
positive areas of our lives, it has also facilitated activities with more negative 
consequences. The global reach and anonymity of the Internet has resulted in its 
quickly becoming a breeding ground for illegal activities. One such activity, that 
continues to grow exponentially (Wolak, Finkelhor, and Mitchell 2005; Loughlin 
and Taylor-Butts 2009), is child exploitation. This most commonly occurs 
through the distribution of child pornography. In this article, “child pornography” 
will refer to the actual content itself, while “child exploitation” will refer to the 
overall phenomenon, which includes child pornography. 
Due to the unregulated and seemingly anonymous nature of the Internet, 
online pedophile networks have flourished (Akdeniz 1999). Durkin (1997) 
outlines three ways that sex offenders have been able to utilize the Internet: for 
dissemination, social networking, and sexual communication with children. 
Dissemination involves the distribution of child pornographic images, videos, or 
textual stories, while social networking refers to communication with other 
pedophiles through chatrooms and newsgroups. Chatrooms and newsgroups are 
also used to misrepresent oneself as a youth, for the purpose of sexual 
communication with children. This article focuses on the first use, dissemination. 
As of 2009, the United Nations estimates that there are more than four million 
websites containing child pornography, and that 35 percent of these websites 
depict serious sexual assault, while 70 percent involve children under the age of 
eight (Engeler 2009). 
Despite large investments of law enforcement resources, by global 
governments, and extensive monetary contributions by private organizations,1 
online child exploitation is nowhere near under control. In fact, McLaughlin 
(2004) estimates that less than one percent of all online pedophiles are 
apprehended. This is not to say that existing efforts have been futile. Image 
databases, such as the United States Division of Criminal Justice Services 
Database,2
                                                            
1 This includes organizations specifically examining child exploitation, such as the National Child 
Exploitation Coordination Centre in Canada, the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre 
in the United Kingdom, and the National Centre for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) in 
the United States, as well as corporations who conduct business online, such as Microsoft, Google, 
and Mastercard. 
 the International Child Sexual Exploitation Image Database (ICSE-
2 The database consists of over 8000 images that are used to aid in the detection and removal of 
child pornography on social networking sites such as Facebook and MySpace (Office of the 
Attorney General 2010). 
DB),3 and the National Child Victim Identification Program (NCVIP),4
 
 have 
aided in the identification of child pornography websites and the rescuing of 
children being victimized. In addition, cross-national law enforcement operations, 
such as Avalanche, Blue Orchid, and Cathedral have resulted in the apprehension 
of some of the largest and most influential players of the time (see Krone 2005 for 
a summary of international police operations). However, as the problem continues 
to grow, new targets emerge.  
Identifying the Key Players in Online Child Exploitation Networks 
 
Law enforcement agencies are faced with many challenges in regards to online 
child pornography, not the least of which is to find the most appropriate targets to 
investigate. These priority targets have commonly been described by social 
network analysts as the “key players” (Sparrow, 1991; Borgatti 2003; Easton and 
Karaivanov, 2009; Schwartz and Rouselle, 2009; Malm and Bichler, in press). 
How one defines and measures the key player is both a matter of debate and of 
context. For example, a target may be important because it commits the most 
crime, because it possesses the most information on other network members, or 
because it holds a crucial position in the network that cannot be replaced. Law 
enforcement agencies may draw on multiple measures and criteria to identify the 
key players they need to target. For example, Borgatti (2006) notes that law 
enforcement typically has two primary goals when investigating criminal 
networks. The first goal is disruption, where the most connected players within 
the network are targeted. The three most common social network analysis 
methods to determine this are degree, closeness, and betweenness centrality 
measures. Degree centrality refers to the number of direct connections (ties) a 
player (node) has with all others within a network. Closeness centrality examines 
how close node A is to node B, in comparison to how close node C is to node B. 
If the path from node A to node B is shorter, then A has a higher closeness value. 
Betweenness centrality is the ability of one node to act as a broker between two 
other nodes. 
 Two issues with using traditional centrality measures to identify the key 
players within a network are design and group selection (Borgatti 2003). The 
design issue occurs in networks where several nodes are highly connected. In this 
type of network, the node with the highest degree, closeness, and/or betweenness 
                                                            
3 Created in March 2009, and funded by the European Commission, the ICSE-DS is housed by the 
United Nation’s International Criminal Police Organization, and contains more than 520,000 
images (INTERPOL 2010). 
4 Developed in 1999, and launched in 2003, the NCVIP is one of the largest databases of child 
pornography in the world. In March of 2005, it was merged with the NCMEC database and is now 
jointly maintained (Ministry of Labour and Citizens’ Services 2006).  
may not be the most optimal target. If all the other nodes, connected to the most 
central node, are also highly connected, the removal of the most central node may 
do little to disrupt the overall network. However, if another node is targeted, 
which is less connected overall, but connected to other nodes that rely on it for 
their connection to the overall network, the overall disruption to the network can 
be greater. As for the group selection issue, it pertains to the problem of network 
redundancy. Sometimes the centrality of a node is dependent on another node—in 
this situation, the removal of both nodes is redundant, as the removal of just one 
of them has the same impact on the overall network. 
The second goal of law enforcement when investigating criminal networks 
is intelligence collection, whereby particular players are targeted in order to 
maximize knowledge of the overall network (Schwartz and Rouselle 2009). The 
most common SNA methods for determining this are degree and closeness 
centrality measures. However, Borgatti (2006) argues that degree centrality is 
only useful when examining direct connections between nodes. Put another way, 
degree looks at each node separately and does not take into account the most 
optimal strategy for finding, and possibly removing, a group of nodes. That is, 
degree is less useful when trying to understand the entire network. Turning our 
attention to closeness centrality, although it may be useful as a measure of the 
minimum total “steps” separating a specific node from every other node in the 
network, this analysis can be misleading, as information degrades as it passes 
through people (Borgatti). Consider, for example, node A, who has six direct 
connections and can connect to every other node through 24 steps, and node B, 
who takes longer to go through the network (30 steps) but who has 10 direct 
connections. With the goal of intelligence gathering in mind, targeting node B 
(lower closeness score, but more direct connections) would be the right move—
the information obtained could be more accurate and timely. Put another way, 
closeness fails to weight the quality of the information that is obtained as an 
individual moves further away from the originating source. Given that timely 
information can provide law enforcement with a better opportunity for disruption, 
for child exploitation networks and many other criminal networks, timeliness (or 
lack thereof) should be taken into consideration when identifying key players. 
Translating these two goals of law enforcement to online child 
exploitation networks, disruption translates into a focus on websites’ direct 
connectivity to one another, while the goal of intelligence collection translates into 
a focus on website content (i.e. severity) and how that content is shared across the 
network. The key players of online child exploitation networks should display 
both characteristics: they will be both highly central within their networks, and 
will display the most harmful content. 
The centrality, or connectivity, of a child exploitation website is key to the 
circulation of information and content across the network—one of the main 
raisons d’être of child exploitation networks. As noted previously, much of the 
effort to address online child pornography has focused on the presence of known 
images; however, Krone (2004) suggests that the focus of law enforcement should 
also be on the linkages between websites, and the offenders’ reliance on these 
networks. Indeed, Beech et al. (2008) point out that child pornography networks 
tend to be very well organized, with systems of trade (usually pictures and video), 
mechanisms for circulating information (commonly through the links between 
websites), and methods of inclusion and exclusion of network members. In this 
article, we measure connectivity by the amount of links to, and from, a given 
website. In the absence of a direct measure of web traffic, these links provide the 
closest publicly available measure of exposure. We are interested in exposure and 
potential—sites that are linked to more often are more likely to be followed by 
users, just like someone who is a member of multiple groups and multiple 
networks has a higher likelihood of being known to more people. 
The importance of content severity also cannot be neglected. The most 
connected websites do not necessarily host the most harmful content (and vice 
versa). Measuring severity of content represents an analytical challenge. Taylor et 
al. (2001) argue that the severity of a child pornography collection can be 
measured by three components: size of collection, presence of new and/or private 
material, and age of the children depicted. In conjunction with the Combating 
Paedophile Information Networks in Europe, Taylor et al. created a scale to 
measure picture severity. This scale comprises 10 levels of severity, beginning 
with children in underwear or swimsuits (1), continuing to sexually or provocative 
poses (5), and ending with sadism and/or bestiality (10). Although the number of 
images and the image content are important, other factors should also be 
examined. Krone (2004) points out that the individual’s engagement with the 
material is also important.5
 
 For the purposes of online collections, this can take 
the form of the descriptions (text) posted with the image or fictitious stories about 
sexual exploitation. As a result, it is important that measures of severity take into 
account more than just the presence of images. Therefore, in the current study, we 




As the problem of child pornography online continues to grow, and law 
enforcement resources are further strained, it has become imperative that 
                                                            
5 Engagement can include the way the content is categorized or maintained by the offender, how 
long it has been in their possession, and whether the content is foreign or from their own sexual 
exploitation of a child (Taylor and Quayle 2003, as cited in Krone 2004). 
resources be allocated in the most efficient manner. As previously discussed, 
Durkin (1997) states that the Internet has aided sex offenders in three key ways: 
aiding dissemination, social networking, and sexual communications with minors. 
In the current study, we look to improving current law enforcement strategies, 
while examining the phenomena of dissemination and social networking.  We 
argue that these improvements must take two forms: (1) increasing the automation 
of searches, and (2) refining the systems being used to identify, and prioritize 
websites/targets. This prioritization is especially important given the size of the 
problem: targets are plentiful, and with limited resources, the priority should be 
given to the most harmful targets—the key players. Drawing on recent advances 
in social network analysis we develop a measure called network capital (NC) to 
identify the key players in online child exploitation networks, by focusing both on 
severity (harmfulness of the content) and connectivity (how exposed and easy to 
find is the content). 
As discussed above, there are numerous technological products that aid in 
finding child pornography online; however, one of the key issues with these is 
that they still require substantial human intervention. Although we cannot get 
away from the manual component of child pornography searches, steps can be 
taken to increase the automation process of these searches, and to decrease the 
direct contact police officers have with child exploitative content. By decreasing 
the amount of material officers have to go through, we can increase the amount of 
time an officer can spend on investigating individuals, as well reduce the amount 
of content they have to examine. Therefore, within the current study, we propose 
a web-crawling tool that can be used to automate the process of searching 
websites for child pornography, and provide statistics on user-selected attributes 
from each website. These statistics can then be used to target key players. 
In addition to automating the process of searching for content, we look to 
determine who the key players are within online child exploitation networks. This 
examination is done on the World Wide Web—arguably the medium providing 
the broadest coverage and most visible means for obtaining child pornography 
(Krone 2005).6
                                                            
6 It is important to acknowledge that the distribution of child exploitive content is rampant in other 
Internet domains such as Internet Chat Relay, Newsgroups, Web-chat, and Peer-to-Peer Networks 
(Carr 2004). However, as these domains operate at the micro (individual) level, while the WWW 
operates at the macro level, our study focuses solely on the WWW.  
 Again, by properly identifying the key players we can aid law 
enforcement through the optimization of resource allocation. However, an 
important methodological challenge, before finding those key players, is to 
analytically define the network and its boundaries. Currently, there is a lack of 
research exploring the structural nature of online child exploitation networks. 
Therefore, within the current study, we develop a method to extract child 
exploitation networks, map their structure and analyze their content. This is done 
by looking at how child exploitation networks differ from non-child exploitation 
networks. To determine this, we compare 10 child exploitation website networks 
with 10 non child exploitation networks.  
Our final objective is to uncover the structure of online child pornography 
networks, and to identify their “hardcore key players”: websites whose removal 
would result in the greatest reduction in network capital. This knowledge can then 
be used by law enforcement to make effective decisions on the methods that 
would have the greatest impact on the network. That is, the prioritization of 
targets to only those websites that are both highly connected and that also display 
the most harmful content. Although it would be naïve to suggest that online child 
exploitation can be completely eradicated, social network analysis provides a 
means of understanding the structure and vulnerability of online networks. In 







For this paper, we used a custom-written crawler called Child Exploitation 
Network Extractor (CENE) (for the algorithm, see Appendix). CENE is a 
computer program that automatically browses the World Wide Web and collects 
information about the pages it visits. CENE starts the crawling process at a user-
specified webpage, retrieves the page, analyzes it, and recursively follows the 
links out of the page. The crawling process is performed according to rules, and 
terminates when certain user-specified criteria are met. The result of the crawl is a 
network structure containing information about the content of the websites, and 
the linkages between them. 
For each webpage extracted, certain statistics about the content of the 
webpage, such as frequency of keywords and count of images or videos, are 
collected. When the crawling process is complete, the statistics are aggregated up 
to the website level. For example the statistics for the node www.website.com are 
calculated from the statistics collected from all pages on that website. This is what 
makes up the network for this study. 
Since the Internet is extremely large and a crawler would most likely 
never stop crawling, we implemented three conditional limits into CENE to keep 
the crawling process under control and network relevant. To keep the network 
extraction time bounded, a limit was put on the number of pages retrieved (for 
this paper, it was 250,000). The network size was also fixed at a specific number 
of websites (200). The webpages were retrieved in such a way that each website 
was sampled equally, or as close to equality as possible. Finally, in order to give 
CENE some boundaries for the crawl and guide the network extraction process to 
a relevant network, a set of keywords were defined. This set consisted of 63 
keywords in total, broken up into three groups. The first were words commonly 
used by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to find illegal content 
containing children; most of them code words used by pedophiles online, and also 
included in other studies of online child pornography (Le Grand et al. 2009). The 
second group was words that could be classified as “softcore”, and which may or 
may not be found on child pornography websites. These words were boy, girl, 
child, love, teen, variants of Lolita, twink, young, bath*, pre/post pubescent, 
innocent, smooth, and hairless. The third group of words was labeled as 
“hardcore” and included the following thirteen: sex, penis, cock, vagina, pussy, 
anus, anal, pedo/paedo, oral, virgin, naked, and nude. Although the focus of this 
study was on the most harmful content, it was important to collect a broader range 
of keywords for comparative and network extraction purposes. The distinction 
between hardcore and softcore words was based on the explicit focus on 
sexuality. That is, words that could be found under different, non-child 
pornography settings were classified as softcore. 
For the crawler to include a given webpage in the analysis, it had to 
contain at least seven of the sixty-three unique keywords. If this criterion was 
met, the webpage was assumed to be relevant to the network, the statistics on that 
webpage calculated, and the links pointing out of the page recorded for later visit. 
If the page didn’t meet this criterion, it was assumed to be irrelevant, and was 
discarded with no further links being followed from that page. This classification 
of webpages into the child-exploitation category based on the number of 
keywords has a drawback: if the threshold is too low, false-positives might be 
included in the analysis. Manual verification showed us that seven keywords 
distinguished well between child-exploitation webpages and regular webpages. In 
addition to keywords, the number of videos and images on each node was also 
recorded. To minimize irrelevant images (e.g., emoticons and logos), those 
smaller than 150×150 pixels were excluded; no criterion was set for videos. 
Where the crawler tried to follow a broken link, or if the webpage could not be 
retrieved for any other reason (such as a timeout or password protection), the 
webpage was considered inaccessible and discarded. 
To construct the statistics of each node in the network, the links between 
websites were tracked, as well as the occurrence of each keyword aggregated to 
the website level. Thus, all web pages on a website contributed to the statistics for 
that website. This allowed for the construction of a coherent network, complete 
with statistics assigned to both the websites and links. 
 
 
Network Structure and Content 
 
Ten web pages were chosen as starting points for crawls. Five websites were 
blogs (“Seed-Blog”) and five were non-blogs (“Seed-Site”). These websites were 
selected using two methods. Four were selected from a list of known child 
pornography websites, provided by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s 
Integrated Child Exploitation (ICE) unit, while the other six were selected through 
Google searches using known child pornography search terms (e.g., lolita, 
realkiddy, pthc, and nymphet).7
The two methods of website selection were chosen to mimic the process a 
person might take when searching for child pornography. The four websites 
provided to us by the ICE unit were selected to represent an individual being 
given a known website by another person. The six Google-discovered websites 
were selected to mirror the process an individual might go through if they went to 
search for the content themselves, with no other information. Using the web-
 This process involved inputting the keywords and 
manually verifying the websites suggested by Google. Once a website was found 
to contain child pornography, it was selected as a starting (seed) website. An 
attempt was made to select websites that unambiguously showed children, in 
order to keep the web crawling as close as possible to what would have been a 
manual search by an individual. As for the definition of child pornography, this 
included websites that did not necessarily contain hardcore content, but that 
presented children in sexually provocative ways. This could be done through 
sexual objectification, softcore videos and/or images, and obscene conversations 
depicting sexual activities with children. Bulletin board based forums were 
included as starting websites for seed-site networks, however, the forum had to 
require no registration to view posts on the website. If unique-user identification 
was required, the website was excluded from the analysis. Bit-torrent websites 
were also used as potential starting points for seed-site networks. The starting 
websites for blog networks were strictly of the blog genre. While the starting 
websites contained child pornography, not all of the links necessarily led to other 
(genuine) child pornography—even if seven of our keywords could be found. 
However, the information (keywords, images, videos, and connections) collected 
from each website allows us to rank websites according to their likelihood of 
containing child pornography, thus facilitating target prioritization for law 
enforcement agencies. 
                                                            
7 The selected website was the first that came during each search undertaken, which met our 
requirement. An attempt was made to select boy-centered and girl-centered websites equally. 
crawler, we can map out all the possible routes an individual might take through 
the network to obtain content8
Due to the continually growing importance of blogs within online social 
media (Furukawa et al. 2007), we categorise the starting websites into blogs and 
sites.
. This is important, as we want to obtain a good 
representation of what a potential user might do. 
9
Second, blog website hosts provide increased anonymity as they rarely 
monitor the blogs created by their users. With the common requirement of only a 
username and an email address to create an account, the perceived chances of 
being apprehended for distributing child pornography through a blog is 
considered a priori lower than for other types of websites. For sites, a user would 
have to be wary of detection by law enforcement, as their name would be attached 
to the website registration information. Although each blog host has terms of 
service, it is usually the responsibility of patrons to report a blog containing 
copyrighted or illegal material. In fact, one of the largest hosts, Blogger/Blogspot, 
specifically state in their terms that they do not monitor blogs (Google 2010). 
Therefore, if a blog is found to be publishing illegal content, shutting it down acts 
as little more than a nuisance for the creator, as there is very little preventing the 
user from making another account and continuing their blog under a different, but 
usually similar, name. In other words, the anonymity of online blogs may lead to 
more freedom to network a certain type of content. In addition, the very nature of 
blogs seems to make them more likely than other types of websites to link to other 
blogs or websites. For example, Ali-Hasan and Adamic (2007) found that blog 
networks tend to have reciprocal ties between 27–43 percent of the time. Of 
course, a user will be more inclined to follow the content (child pornography) 
than pay much attention to whether it is hosted on a blog or website (“blog” or 
 This distinction between blogs and sites is important, as it may have 
implications for the content and structure of child exploitation networks. This is 
because blogs provide two benefits over sites when distributing child 
pornography. First, blogs are usually hosted (freely) by a third party, and require 
very little knowledge of web design, or computers in general. That is, the hosts 
typically have specific templates to follow that allow a non-technical person to 
easily set up a blog. Although similar templates exist for sites, there are additional 
steps required, such as purchasing a domain name and setting up a name server to 
point to the computer that is hosting the content. By contrast, many blog hosts, 
such as Blogger, LiveJournal, and Sensualwritter provide members with free 
space to post their blogs. 
                                                            
8 A user may or may not follow those links to find content, we examine the potential for users to 
do so given exposure.  
9 Non-blogs includes picture and video galleries and freely accessed chat forums; however, it 
excludes chatrooms and membership-based websites. Although these are important avenues to 
explore, they are beyond the scope of the current study.  
“site”). Therefore, although each starting website for the crawl corresponds to the 
network type (i.e., blog for blog networks and site for website networks), it is not 
guaranteed that all of the websites within each network are of the same network 
type. That is, blogs will link to other blogs, but they will also link to other sites 
and vice versa with sites. Thus, our network type differentiation refers to the 
starting website rather than all the websites within the network. 
 To compare the structure and content of child pornography networks to 
other types of networks, five blog and five non-blog sports networks were also 
analyzed as a control. The starting websites were selected based on a list of the 
most popular sports websites (Top Sites Blogs, 2010) and the most popular sports 
blogs (Technorati, 2010). Like the child exploitation networks, each of the sports 
networks consisted of 200 nodes, a maximum of 250,000 web pages, and images 
greater than 150×150 pixels. Although the child pornography keywords were 
collected, they were not a criterion for website selection. 
In addition to comparing child exploitation websites to non-child 
exploitation websites, we also want to see if there is something inherently 
different with the structure of the networks when we start with a blog versus 
starting with a site.  The comparison between child exploitation networks starting 
with a blog or site will be made on several measures. The first is whether the 
websites are boy or girl centered, with a simple measure counting the number of 
times each word appears in a website (a website will be considered as boy 
centered if the word “boy” appears more times than the word “girl”). The second 
measure is the prevalence of hardcore content: a website with a higher prevalence 
of hardcore words (sex, penis/cock, vagina/pussy, oral, virgin, lolita, naked/nude, 
and anus/anal) compared to softcore words10
 
 will be classified as hardcore 
focused. The distinction between hardcore and softcore words is based on the 
explicit focus on sexuality. Words that could be found under different, non-child 
pornography settings are classified as softcore. Third, the network types will be 
compared on reciprocity (ie how often, when website A references website B, 
does website B reference website A). This measure informs us on how cohesive 
the network is. Finally, the network types will be compared on their overall 
density; another measure of cohesiveness. Density refers to the proportion of 
direct connections present, between websites, in relation to all possible network 
connections: each website being connected to every other website (Izquierdo and 
Hanneman 2006). 
Determining the Key Players: Measuring Network Capital 
 
                                                            
10 Softcore words, later referred to as “other words”, were: boy, girl, child, love, teen, young, 
bathing, innocent, paedo/pedo, pre/post pubescent, and hairless/smooth. 
Network capital is a term derived by Schwartz and Rouselle (2009), which takes 
into account the resources available to each node, the cohesiveness of the 
network, and the relationships between nodes. The more an individual node 
contributes to network capital, the more central/key the node is to the overall 
network. The formula itself is an extension of Borgatti’s (2006) method for 
identifying key players. We follow Schwartz and Rouselle’s network capital 
formula and adapt it to the specific context of online child exploitation networks 
by incorporating severity of content and website connectivity. By utilizing the 
adapted formula, we are able to meet both goals of law enforcement mentioned 





N   total number of nodes in the network 
RSL   resource sharing level. 
 
 Network capital comprises two key components: node_severity scores 
and node_connectivity scores. Schwartz and Rouselle (2009) describe 
node_severity to refer to the resources available to a given node that may, or may 
not, be shared with the rest of the network. In the current study, we define 
node_severity scores as the summation of three resources: the number of 
keywords, images, and videos per web page.11
Each of the resources is standardized against the highest scoring node, for 
each resource, within the network. This means that for each of the three resources, 
the website with the highest number of images, videos, or words, receives a score 
of 1.0, with all other websites ranging between 0 and 1.0. The individual 
node_severity score is then the average of the three resources.
 Analyzing the number of images 
and videos is not the same as analyzing the nature of their content (the way that 
keywords do). This study is limited by the assumption that a larger volume of 
images/videos is more harmful than a smaller one. 
12
 
 Therefore, the 
formula for calculating node_severity scores is as follows: 
                                                            
11 Although the “type” of activity within the content is important when discussing severity, this 
was not possible for this study without viewing each video and image and scoring it.  
12 Because of the way the attribute weighting is derived, it is more tailored to intra- rather than 




i   node 
AW1i, AW2i, AW3i weighted number of keywords (AW1), images (AW2), and 
videos (AW3), ranging from 0.0 to 1.0.  
NAWi number of resources (3) 
  
The second component of network capital is node_connectivity. This 
refers to the contribution made by a node to the overall network based on the 
direct connections it has to other nodes within the network, and the amount of 
resources it has available.13 This is multiplied by the percentage of its resources 
made available by the node to the rest of the network14 and then multiplied by any 
link-weighted values. In the current study, we included only one link weight: 
number of times node A references node B. The number of times node A 
references node B effectively increases the exposure of node B and thus adds to 
their connectivity.15
 
 The link weights have been standardized between 0.0 and 1.0 
using the same method as the resource weights. Therefore, the formula for 




i    node 
AW1i, AW2i, AW3i weighted number of keywords, images, and videos, ranging 
from 0.0 to 1.0.  
                                                            
13 Although Schwartz and Rouselle’s (2009) formula included indirect connections, they have 
been excluded in this study because the small size of the networks (200 nodes) resulted in all 
nodes being either one or two steps away from every other node. In other words, we hold indirect 
connections as a constant for the purpose of this study.  
14 For the purposes of the current study, we assumed a resource sharing level of 1.0. This is 
because all of the websites within our networks are open (do not require a membership) and thus 
all resources we have recorded are available to all others who go to the website.  
15 A key component of Schwartz and Rouselle’s (2009) formula is the inclusion of isolates, but the 
logic of the web crawler makes it impossible to find true isolates (i.e. a website that connects to no 
other, and vice versa). This is a limitation of the crawler, as some isolates may lack connectivity 
yet host harmful content and be important targets for law enforcement.  
NAWi number of resources (3) 
RSL   the resource sharing level 
LWij weighted number of times node i references node j, ranging 







We start by comparing the child exploitation networks to the control networks. In 
general, the control networks were easier to construct than the child exploitation 
networks. In total, of the pages we attempted to visit only 66 percent of the child 
exploitation seed-blog web pages were active (ie no broken links, or expired 
domains), while even fewer (56 percent) were active for the seed-site networks 
(Table 1). Conversely, the control seed-blog and seed-site networks were 98 
percent active. These discrepancies might be the result of the relative legality of 
content within the networks. Due to the illegal nature of the child exploitation 
networks, they run a higher likelihood of being shutdown, while a blog about 
baseball does not run similar risks. One way of verifying the legality of websites 
being a contributing factor to their accessibility is through our measure of 
hardcore words per page. That is, if specific words are used by law-enforcement 
and other agencies to target potential child exploitation websites, the lack of these 
words would result in their being ignored by law enforcement. As shown in Table 
1, the hardcore keywords were found at a much higher frequency per page within 
child exploitation networks (71 occurrences per page for seed-blog and 350 for 
seed-site networks) than sport-related networks (around four hardcore words per 
page). The t-tests presented in Table 2 show that these differences are statistically 
significant. From that point of view, it suggests that the words selected for the 
web crawler are good predictors of child pornography content. However, the 
degree to which the keywords distinguish between child pornography websites 
and legal pornography websites is unclear: this issue is discussed in detail later. 
Control networks were much lower in videos and images per page, in comparison 
to child exploitation networks. This may not be that surprising, as we have 
outlined previously that one of the key purposes of online child exploitation 
networks is to exchange content. Therefore, it would lead one to believe that, in 
comparison to an average sports website, websites devoted to child exploitation 
would have higher rates of videos and images per page. 
Table 1 also compares the two samples of five seed-blog and five seed-site 
child exploitation networks (labeled based on starting point). Websites dedicated 
to girls and hardcore content were more common when the seed was not a blog 
than when it was (t=2.22, P=0.03; t=5.48, P=0.00). Although using a blog as a 
starting point led to a larger number of valid nodes (138 to 60), networks with a 
site as a starting point averaged more web pages and images per node (see Tables 
3 and 4). Seed-site networks had more hardcore words per web page, while seed-
blog networks had more videos per web page. The significantly higher number of 
hardcore words per web page found in site networks might account for the smaller 
network sizes. That is, the excessive number of words may result in search 
engines indexing those websites more, therefore making it easier for the websites 
to be found and shutdown. 
 




n = 5 
Seed-Sites 
 (C.E.)  
n = 5 
Seed-Blogs 
(Controls) 
n = 5 
Seed-Sites 
(Controls) 




(Across all networks) 
688 299 938 917 
Average/network 137.6 59.8 187.6 183.4 
Web 
pages (n) 











Per Node 855.57 1,369.97 1,312.17 1,333.12 
Website 
focus 
Boy (%) 62.8 55.2 – – 
Hardcore (%) 39.2 57.9 – – 
Hardcore 
words (n) 
Per Node 60,289.85 479,878.96 4,955.50 6,406.58 
Per Page 70.47 350.28 3.78 4.81 
Other 
words (n) 
Per Node 121,706.79 331,672.88 8,641.25 11,874.32 
Per Page 142.25 242.10 6.59 8.91 
Videos 
(n) 
Per Node 1,967.02 1,058.74 220.14 208.32 
Per Page 2.30 0.77 0.17 0.16 
Images 
(n) 
Per Node 9,122.45 16,354.48 1,559.45 2,028.88 
Per Page 10.66 11.94 1.19 1.52 
Note: the networks are differentiated based on whether the starting point (or seed) was a blog or a 
regular website.  
 
Table 2. Summary of t-tests comparing child exploitation networks to each other, 
and to control networks. 
 















Pages per node –4.01** –0.40 –7.67** 0.30 
Hardcore words per page –10.33** –3.65** 25.15** 14.95** 
Videos per node 1.63 0.31 4.30** 2.22* 
Videos per page 3.94** 0.48 10.31** 10.14** 
Images per node –2.33* 1.67 7.77** 4.83*** 
Images per page –1.10 –0.87 17.87** 17.40** 
*P<0.05; **P<0.01 
 
Despite the wide range in hardcore words found, the number of videos per 
web page and images per web page were relatively low (0.00 to 1.76 and 1.85 to 
22.89, respectively). The discrepancies between hardcore words and 
videos/images might be, in part, due to the nature of seed-site networks. As many 
of the websites within the site networks were community forum based, few would 
have had images, and especially videos, embedded within the page. Instead, they 
would have provided links within the forum post, which would allow a person to 
obtain the actual content. In addition, one of the starting websites used (Site C) 
was bit-torrent based.16
 
 In this situation, we would find the keywords identifying 
a file (or topic); however, the file would either not be physically located on the 
website or would require special access (e.g., password). Therefore, it might be 
that videos and images are just as, or even more, prominent in seed-site networks, 
however, the content is not as directly present and available as it is with seed-blog 
networks. 
Table 3. Descriptives for five child exploitation seed-blog networks. 
 
 Blog A  Blog B  Blog C  Blog D  Blog E  
Nodes (n) Valid 145 157 163 111 112 
Hardcore 
(%) 
13.1 31.8 30.7 73.0 62.5 
Boy (%) 93.1 91.1 88.3 7.2 1.8 
Web pages 
(n) 
Final 250,031 176,829 220,417 109,257 134,293 
Valid 152,987 122,930 158,391 70,915 83,409 
Per node 1,055.08 783.00 971.72 638.87 744.72 
                                                            
16 Bit-torrent is a peer-to-peer file sharing protocol that allows the user to download parts of a file 
from multiple people at once. This allows two people with an incomplete file to share the parts 
they already have with the rest of the network, while they are downloading the remaining parts. 
Pages on starting node (n) 5,118 512 142 433 1,315 
Nodes connected to by 
starting node (% of 200 
nodes) 
109 (54.8) 90 (45.2)  89 (44.7)  6 (3.0) 179 (89.9) 
Hardcore 
words (n) 
Per node 48,696 52,228 60,522 70,818 75,827 
Per Page 46.15 66.70 62.28 110.85 101.82 
Other 
words (n) 
Per Node 143,342 140,795 180,853 28,3601 73,371 
Per page 135.86 179.82 186.12 44.39 98.52 
Videos (n) Per node 3,395.79 2,097.11 2,736.39 467.41 301.39 
Per page 3.22 2.68 2.82 0.73 0.40 
Images (n) Per node 9,027.46 8,393.59 12,544.65 2,619.67 11,731 
Per page 8.56 10.72 12.91 4.10 15.75 
 
Seed-blog networks were found to be more reciprocal than seed-site 
networks (18 vs 9 percent), although the reciprocity rates were lower in our study. 
Despite the difference in reciprocation, the density scores were comparable; about 
seven percent (seed-sites) to eight percent (seed-blogs) of potential ties were 
present in the networks.  
 
Table 4. Descriptives for five child exploitation seed-site networks. 
 
 Site A Site B Site C  Site D Site E  
Nodes (n) Valid 162 24 46 36 31 
Hardcore 
(%) 
54.9 100.0 8.7 80.6 87.1 
Boy (%) 92.6 100.0 23.9 2.8 9.7 
Web pages 
(n) 
Final 250,154 207,909 87,199 87,199 109,882 
Valid 182,604 116,549 34,011 18.022 58,436 
Per node 1,127.19 4,856.21 739.37 500.61 1,885.03 
Pages on starting node 
(n) 
5,197 5,571 1,010 85 263 
Nodes connected to by 
starting node (% of 200 
nodes) 
18 (9.0) 199 (100.0) 10 (5.0) 23 (11.6)  104 (52.3) 
Hardcore 
words (n) 
Per node 63,762.41 3,313,712.75 10,941.57 207,767.72 1,472,330.39 
Per page 56.57 682.37 14.80 415.03 781.06 
Other 
Words 
Per node 73,247.96 2,239,022.63 61,786.87 118,565.97 853,448.61 
Per page 64.98 461.06 83.57 236.84 452.75 
Videos Per node 1,532.45 256.92 1,304.63 53.97 5.90 
Per page 1.36 0.05 1.76 0.11 0.00 
Images Per node 4,746.14 111,176.54 2,344.61 1,016.22 42,207.81 
Per page 4.21 22.89 3.17 2.03 1.85 
 
Finding the Key Players 
 
The main objective of this study is to find the key players in online child 
exploitation networks. The connectivity, severity, and network capital scores for 
each network are presented in Tables 5 and 6. First note that seed-site networks 
have much higher network capital scores than seed-blog networks, indicating that 
there are several very high scoring websites in the smaller seed-site networks.  
After multiplying by 1000 (to ease interpretation), the network capital scores for 
seed-blogs ranged from 0.38 to 1.0 (blog E), while for seed-site networks, it 
ranged from 0.66 to 33.9 (site B). The reason for these differences in ranges might 
be due to the variation in sizes between the two types of networks, as well as the 
smaller overall size of seed-site networks: with fewer valid nodes, extreme values 
have more leverage on network capital. However, this is not necessarily a 
negative. Extreme nodes are easier to find as they stand out more, as shall be seen 
below. 
 
Table 5. Network capital descriptives for the five seed-blog child exploitation networks. 
 
 Blog A  Blog B  Blog C  Blog D  Blog E  
Connectivity 
score 
Mean 0.005 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Median 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Max 0.146 0.205 0.136 0.285 0.230 
Severity score Mean 0.048 0.055 0.064 0.066 0.100 
Median 0.030 0.028 0.035 0.041 0.063 
Max 0.390 0.370 0.380 0.490 0.420 
Total network capital (x1000) 0.38 0.41 0.43 0.69 1.00 

























Table 6. Network capital descriptives for the five seed-site child exploitation 
networks. 
 
 Site A Site B Site C  Site D Site E  
Connectivity 
score 
Mean 0.077 0.067 0.004 0.001 0.053 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Max 0.548 2.437 0.552 0.078 1.538 
Severity score Mean 0.077 0.252 0.098 0.072 0.270 
Median 0.040 0.162 0.051 0.030 0.179 
Max 0.630 0.670 0.670 0.820 0.670 
Total network capital (x1000) 0.66 33.90 2.53 2.11 19.78 

























Overall, nodes within seed-site networks proved to host more harmful 
content than when we used a blog as a starting point to crawl the networks. With 
those general observations in mind, a lot of variation was still found within the 
networks. Several nodes act as outliers, that is, they have much higher network 
capital scores than others. These nodes, the key players, should be the focus of 
law enforcement agencies. Network capital proved to be a useful tool in finding 
the key players, as it helped highlight nodes that were both highly connected, and 
were hosting the greatest amount of harmful content given the assumptions of our 
measure. 
The distribution of network capital is illustrated in Figures 1A (blog A 
network) and 1B (site A).17
 
 Both figures show a wide distribution in network 
capital scores, especially for the larger seed-blog network (Figure 1A). The 
figures also illustrate how the top 10 network capital scores (denoted in red) 
clearly stand out from the rest of the network. Combined with Table 7 it is clear 
that even the top five scores (Node ID: 179, 29, 51, 141, and 119) stand out from 
the next top five (38, 140, 158, 182, and 174). For site A (Figure 1B), the 
distinction between overall contributions to network capital is still evident; 
however, it is in three clustering sections with the top two nodes (164 and 63) 
clearly contributing more than any other nodes, the bottom three nodes clustering 











                                                            
17 Although 10 networks were analyzed, we selected these two networks for representative 
reasons. The rest of the networks followed the same patterns. Site A was selected to represent the 









Figure 1B. Network capital for Site Network A with top 10 scores highlighted. 
 
 
Figure 2A. Severity scores with top five severity scores (red) and connectivity 
scores (yellow) highlighted for Blog Network A. 
 
Figure 2B. Severity scores with top five severity (red), connectivity (yellow), and 
severity + connectivity (green) highlighted for Site Network A. 
 
The importance of using network capital, as opposed to any of the two 
measures (severity and connectivity) alone, is illustrated in Figures 2A and 2B, 
and described in Table 7. Figure 2A shows all nodes in seed-blog network A, 
sized by their content severity score. The five nodes highlighted in yellow 
represent the top five connectivity scores, while the red nodes represent the top 
five severity scores. Both Figure 2A and Table 7 show that nodes high in content 
severity do not necessarily score highly for connectivity. For example, the node 
with the highest severity score (179) is not in the top ten for connectivity; and 
vice versa (node 119). In fact, none of the nodes score in the top 10 for both 
severity and connectivity. Figure 2B provides a similar illustration as 2A, but with 
seed-site network A. In Table 7, we see that the same node (164) is highest in 
severity and connectivity. This translates more generally into a stronger 
association between the two scores for sites, although they do not match exactly. 
It is entirely plausible that the priorities of law enforcement agencies are such that 
they might decide to focus on severity only. Our approach suggests that doing so 
will miss important targets.  That is, they will miss the nodes that are the most 
connected.  This is important as the nodes that are the most connected should be 
able to distribute content the fastest, to the most users. 
 
Table 7. Top ten nodes (by Node ID number) for network capital, severity, and 
connectivity, for Blog A and Site A networks 
 
BLOG A SITE A 
Network Capital Severity Connectivity Network Capital Severity Connectivity 
179 179 119 164 164 164 
29 29 3 63 63 184 
51 51 89 168 128 157 
141 141 32 128 159 168 
119 140 38 159 168 123 
38 158 130 143 143 171 
140 38 145 171 171 121 
158 182 121 69 69 120 
182 174 59 84 84 122 
174 178 126 71 71 103 
 
Removing Key Players from Networks 
 
One reason for finding the key players in any network is simply to provide a more 
efficient way to prioritize targets, as is suggested in this study. Another reason is 
to find the targets that, if removed, can create the most “disruption” in a network. 
To examine the importance of key players in our networks, we: (1) calculated 
total network capital scores for the networks as a whole (Tables 5 and 6); (2) 
removed the top contributors to network capital based on their network capital 
score;18
                                                            
18 The five node removal proceeded in stages. First with the removal of the top contributor, then a 
re-calculation of the new network to find the new top target, etc. Schwartz and Rouselle argue that 
multiple combinations of a set of nodes (in our case the top five) need to be calculated to 
determine which are the best to target (due to redundancy). We only took the top five because 
connectivity redundancy, amongst the top five nodes, was low. This meant that the most optimal 
removal combination, within each network, involved removing the top contributor to network 
capital, followed by the next highest, followed by the next. Note that if redundancy within each 
network’s top five network capital scores had been high, the method of removing the top five 
contributors to network capital may not have been the most optimal. 
 and (3) re-calculated the new network capital score for the entire network 
and compared it to the initial score. Tables 5 and 6 show that removing the top 
five network capital contributors from each network, network capital was reduced 
an average of 14.4 percent for blogs and 36.2 percent for seed-site networks. The 
reduction was consistent for seed-blog networks, ranging from a 9–21 percent 
reduction, while seed-site networks varied from 21–63 percent. These reductions 
seem to be the result of network size, as networks with the lowest number of valid 
nodes (blogs D and E, and sites B–E) had the most significant reductions in 
network capital; with the exception of blog E and site E. There was no specific 
correlation between network reduction and standard deviation, as the websites 
with the largest standard deviations (blog E, sites B and E) did not have the 
largest network capital reduction. This suggests that network capital reduction is 
more sophisticated than simply taking the outliers within a network. Instead, it is 
a combination of multiple factors that account for the discrepancies.  
Although the removal of the top five contributing nodes to network capital 
resulted in a significant reduction in most of the networks, is this reduction 
different to that which results from removing random nodes? Using a random 
number generator, we randomly selected five nodes from each network to be 
removed. The results are presented in Tables 5 and 6. With the exception of Blog 
Network E, selecting the five top network capital scores resulted in at least a four-
fold greater percentage decrease in network capital. Although still lower, the 
difference found in Blog Network E was 50 percent. Like the blog networks, the 
site networks also had a greater reduction in network capital, when the top 
contributors were selected over a random sample; however, the amount of 
reduction varied. For instance, in Site Network B, the percentage change was 
small (29.8 vs 24.4 percent), while in Site Network C, the change was large (43.1 
vs 0.0 percent). Obviously, removing the top five contributors to network capital 
will result in a greater reduction than five randomly selected nodes; however, the 
fact that, in most networks, the difference was substantial tells us three things. 
First, the use of network capital successfully differentiates nodes within a 
network. Second, that within each network, there are sites that truly stand out 
compared to others (the key players). Third, that police investigations need to be 
targeted, and not random, as targeted attacks can have a much greater impact on 




The Internet has provided the social, individual, and technological circumstances 
needed in order for the production, distribution, and consumption of child 
pornography to flourish (Taylor and Quayle 2003). This study provides a snapshot 
of the structure of this online world through an analysis of the networks formed 
by connections between child exploitation websites. The main goal was to design 
a method to find, within these networks, the websites that should be prioritized by 
law enforcement agencies involved in combating child pornography—the key 
players. These objectives were accomplished by: (1) designing a web crawler to 
extract online child exploitation networks, and (2) by adapting the measure of 
“network capital” first created by Schwartz and Rousselle (2009) to the context of 
child exploitation networks. Instead of focusing strictly on connectivity or 
exposure within the network, our measure of network capital also took into 
account the severity of content (i.e, keywords, images, and videos). In doing so, 
we began to address Krone’s (2004) request to incorporate the linkages between 
websites as well as Taylor, Holland, and Quayle’s (2001) work on the severity of 
website content. 
First, the web crawler we designed was found to be suitable in properly 
identifying child exploitation websites. The clear differences found in hardcore 
content between child exploitation and non-child exploitation websites increase 
the validity of our strategy. As will be discussed below, the web crawler still 
generates false positives, which invites further refinement of the tool. Another 
limitation is that we currently have no way of verifying whether the images and 
videos found in those websites always display exploited children. While it could 
be thought that website owners would find ways to avoid being detected by a web 
crawler of the type we have used, child exploitation websites turned out being 
easy to find. Despite the fact that much of the content is illegal, our initial Google 
searches found countless websites linking to child erotica and child pornography. 
Previous research by Wolak et al. (2005) found that only 20 percent of online 
child pornography arrestees used sophisticated tools for hiding illegal content, 
while Carr (2004) found that only 25 percent did. Therefore, the problem is not 
just simply websites that host the material, but also the ease with which the 
material can be obtained: this is because the problem is not simply distribution of 
the content, but rather its use in lowering the inhibitions, or normalizing the 
behavior, for prospective victims. 
Second, we found that the structure of online networks pertaining to child 
exploitation were different from networks of websites without that content. More 
specifically, child exploitative websites had more dead links and pages, as well as 
higher frequencies of images and photos per page. This is to be expected, as prior 
research has noted how child exploitation websites exist for the very purpose of 
exchanging content (Tremblay 2006; Beech et al. 2008). 
Despite having two “types” of seed-networks (blogs and sites) it is unclear 
what percentage of the websites within each network actually coincides with the 
type of network: this is why we have refrained from interpreting the networks as 
being composed of “blogs” or “sites”. 
When comparing the two different types of child exploitation websites 
based on starting point, it was found that the number of images per page was 
equal; however, seed-blog networks had more videos per page. It is unclear 
whether this is the result of the structure of the network (i.e. as influenced by our 
starting point) or something entirely different. Within blogs, the content is 
embedded directly onto the page; however, with sites, the content is sometimes 
linked to indirectly. That is, the site may provide a link to another website 
(possibly a blog) that hosts the content, or a link to a peer-to-peer program. The 
small number of networks that could be extracted for this study does not allow us 
to make a clear statement on whether blogs act more as hosts/producers and sites 
as distributors. 
One of this study’s key objectives has been to determine whether a 
modified version of Schwartz and Rouselle’s (2009) network capital measure 
could aid in identifying the key players within online child exploitation networks. 
Our results suggest that it could. We found that websites with harmful content had 
varying degrees of exposure in the derived networks, and that the measure of 
network capital was able to discriminate properly between targets that met (or 
didn’t meet) both criteria. This demonstrates the utility of a network approach in 
target prioritization when targets are in abundant supply, as is the case for child 
exploitation websites. Note that we adapted the measure network capital from 
another domain (e.g. organized crime), and that similar adaptations to other fields 
are both possible, and desirable: the measure has always been intended to be of 
general use to any social network analysis (Schwartz and Rouselle 2009). The 
concept of network capital is also worthy of further theoretical refinements (e.g. 
Wellman and Frank 2001), as it may prove more useful than the more general 
concept of social capital in certain network contexts. 
 Finally, given that the websites with the highest severity scores did not 
necessarily coincide with the websites that were the most connected, emphasizes 
the need to incorporate both factors into the analysis. As for the reason why the 
most connected websites were not the websites with the highest severity, the 
answer is not clear. One possible reason for this is that the most connected 
websites are the most likely to be discovered. Another possible reason is that 
some websites may focus on providing content directly, while others might focus 
on connecting individuals to content. This might be because of personal 
preference or for legal reasons: those that are not directly hosting the material, but 
are telling people where they can find it, might feel they are less liable or likely to 
be apprehended. 
Our findings also support the need for targeted attacks on networks. Recall 
that network capital consists of text, images, videos, and connections to other 
websites. This means that when targeted tactics are employed, a larger percentage 
of text, images, videos, and connections to others are impacted—or removed—
from the overall network. As has been suggested earlier, the extensive amount of 
content located on the Internet means that the likelihood of eradicating the 
problem of child exploitation online is nil. Therefore, steps need to be taken to 
maximize the current efforts by law enforcement and private organizations. Our 
findings suggest that the use of a network capital measure can aid in maximizing 
the impact of efforts to disrupt online child exploitation networks. 
In regard to the most optimal removal strategy, although Schwartz and 
Rouselle (2009) argue that multiple combinations of a set of nodes (in our case 
the top five) need to be calculated in order to determine which are the best to 
target (due to redundancy), we only took the top five. The reason for this was that 
connectivity redundancy, amongst the top five nodes, was low. This meant that 
the most optimal removal combination, within each network, involved removing 
the top contributor to network capital, followed by the next highest, followed by 
the next. However, if redundancy within each network’s top five network capital 
scores had been high, the method of removing the top five contributors to network 
capital may not have been the most optimal. For instance, if the top two 
contributors to network capital had high connectivity between one another, it may 
be redundant to remove both nodes from the network; or not the most optimal 
removal strategy. Regardless, the comparison between the removal of the top five 
contributing nodes (targeted) and the removal of five random nodes (random) 
provides support for the use of a network capital measurement as an improvement 
to existing strategies. That is, node targeting appears to be an effective tool in 
combating online child exploitation. 
 
Research and Policy Implications 
 
A key policy aspect to law enforcement is devising policing methods that reduce 
cost, improve existing methods, and improve officers’ ability to continue doing 
their job. By creating a web crawler that reduces the amount of hours officers 
need to spend examining possible child pornography websites, and determining 
whom to target, we believe that we have touched on each of these key areas of 
law enforcement policy. An automated process has the added benefit of aiding to 
keep officers in the department longer, as they would not be subjugated to as 
much traumatic content (Perez, Jones, Englert, & Sachau, 2010) . However, there 
are still areas in which what we have proposed here can be improved. 
The first step for future research is to further refine the web crawler. In 
order to develop a tool that can be used by law enforcement, and/or private 
organizations, several modifications need to be made. Despite being a 
considerable improvement over a manual analysis of 300,000 web pages, the web 
crawler’s functionality could be improved to allow for efficient analysis of larger, 
yet still-relevant, networks. Doing so will not simply bring us closer to the true 
size of the full online child exploitation network, but also, we expect, to some of 
the more hidden (e.g. password/membership protected) websites. However, it is 
important to note that there are privacy issues with examining password-protected 
domains. In Canada, for instance, this type of research would require a warrant to 
search the protected files. Therefore, despite the desire to investigate these 
locales, in practice this might be difficult or impossible to achieve. 
The current version of the web crawler is designed to find and catalog any 
target closely related to online child exploitation. As such, it is equally likely to 
retrieve websites hosting hardcore child pornography content, as well as websites 
sitting on the fence of child erotica and adult pornography. There are two reasons 
for this. First, the web crawler was unable to examine membership websites (e.g., 
pay websites and member-based chat forums).19 Although it is unclear what 
percentage of World Wide Web content requires a membership for access, Beech 
et al. (2008) point out that child pornography websites often have self-regulatory 
methods, such as membership, for excluding individuals. Ergo, the ability to 
analyze websites that require a membership is clearly an area of need. However, 
this does not negate the value of researching publicly accessible/open websites for 
three reasons. First, the websites provide some security for the viewer, as no 
personal information (e.g., credit card) is required. Second, these websites are 
probably being used as an initial starting location for most individuals. Third, 
although child erotica may be viewed as less severe, Wolak, Finkelhor, and 
Mitchell (2005) found that 79 percent of individuals arrested in the United States 
for child pornography possession also possessed child erotica images,20
The second value of this research is that, although continued refinement of 
keyword and video content analyses are important, the primary focus of future 
study improvements will relate to the images. Within the current study, the web 
crawler totaled the number of images on a website meeting a specific size 
criterion (greater than 150 by 150 pixels); however, it did not distinguish between 
the image content. As previously mentioned, much of the law enforcement to date 
has focused on investigating images; the primary reason being that a “hash 
function” exists for images, and not for videos. This refers to the mathematical 
process of taking a large piece of data and reducing it to  it into a single “hash 
value” (Howard 2004), which act as a form of encryption and can be used to 
authenticate the content of an image (Hoffman 2010). According to Hardy and 
Kreston (2004), the chances of two files having the same hash value, but different 
content, is one in 1038. Therefore, utilizing known hash values,
 while 
only one percent of these arrestees possessed just child erotica. This positive 
association suggests that the individuals visiting websites containing hardcore 
content are probably also visiting websites containing child erotica content. 
21
                                                            
19 These forums typically exist for people to chat and exchange content outside of the visible 
website channels (Tremblay 2006). 
 instead of just 
the total number of images, would help improve the validity of our severity 
20 Child erotica refers to image content that does not contain nudity and is not specifically for 
sexual purposes. This includes young children in provocative poses, costumes, or form-fitting 
clothing such as bathing suits. 
21 Currently many law enforcement agencies, the RCMP included, will calculate the hash value for 
any and all images they encounter, and store both the image, the classification/severity of the 
image, and the hash information in a database. For any computer/hard-drive/collection-of-files law 
enforcement encounters during an investigation, they can automatically scan the hard-drive, 
calculating all hash values for all files, and check each hash value against the database. In this 
fashion law enforcement can immediately identify the severity of all known images, and manually 
process only the unknown ones. With the help of this hash database, CENE could similarly 
identify the severity of all known images as it crawls the web. 
measurement.22
Finally, as the decentralized nature of the Internet making combating child 
exploitation difficult, it becomes more important to introduce new methods to 
address this. This is especially true online, where there is little to no face-to-face 
contact between users. Therefore, social network analysis measurements, in 
general, can be of great assistance to law enforcement investigating all forms of 
online crime—not just online child exploitation. However, an important point to 
consider is that the individual(s) “running the organization” (i.e. operating the 
website) may not actually be the key players. As websites allow for contributions 
by multiple people, the individual operating the website may only act as a broker, 
while other individuals may actually be the key players on whom law 
enforcement should focus their attention. In other words, shutting down a website 
and apprehending the operator may not do much to reduce the problem. This leads 
to the need to combine social network analysis methods, such as measurements of 
network capital, with other methods to create a multi-dimensional approach to 
combat online crime. 
 Of course, the development of hash values for videos would be a 




                                                            
22 Nevertheless, it may still be important to incorporate child erotica images into future analyses. 
In this scenario, our severity measure would include two image values: known child pornography, 
and “other”.  
Appendix. The Child Exploitation Network Extractor Algorithm. 
 
Algorithm  
CENE(StartPage, PageLimit, WebsiteLimit, Keywords(), BadWebsites(),minImageWidth, 
minImageHeight) 
 1: Queue() ← {StartPage} 
 2: KeywordsInWebsiteCounter() ← 0, LinkFrequency() ← {}, WebsitesUsed() ← {}, FollowedLinks() 
← {}  //initialize variables 
 3: while |FollowedPages| < PageLimit and |Queue| > 0 
 4: P ← Queue(1), DP ← domain of P //start evaluating next page in queue 
 5: if DP ∉WebsitesUsed() and |WebsitesUsed| < WebsiteLimit then 
 6: WebsitesUsed() ← WebsitesUsed() + DP 
 7: if DP ∈WebsitesUsed() and DP ∉BadWebsites() then //evaluate this page 
 8: PageContents ← Retrieve page P VideoCounter ← 0, ImageCounter ← 0 
 9: FollowedPages ← FollowedPages + P 
10: if PageContents contains Keywords() 
11: KeywordsInWebsiteCounter() ← get frequency of all Keywords() 
12: LinksToFollow() ← all {href} elements in PageContents 
13: for each L in LinksToFollow()  
if L links to an image ImageContents ← retrieve image I //if the link leads to an image 
if width(ImageContents) > minImageWidth and height(ImageContents) > minImageHeight then 
ImageCounter ← ImageCounter + 1     //count only if the image is big enough 
else if L links to a video //if the link leads to a video VideoCounter ← VideoCounter + 1 
14: if L∉Queue() and L∉FollowedPages   Queue() ← Queue() + L  DL ← domain of L 
15: LinkFrequency(DP, DL) ← LinkFrequency(DP, DL) + 1    
VideosInWebsite(DP) ← VideosInWebsite(DP) + VideoCounter   
 ImagesInWebsite(DP) ← ImagesInWebsite(DP) + ImageCounter 
16: KeywordsInWebsite(DP) ← KeywordsInWebsite(DP) +    KeywordsInWebsiteCounter() 
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